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CREATION OF SERVITUDES BY PRESCRIPTION AND
DESTINATION OF THE OWNER
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
Article 654 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that "predial ser-
vitudes may be natural, legal, and voluntary or conventional."' There
is a corresponding classification of predial servitudes in the French
Civil Code.2 In Germany and in Greece, however, the notions of natural
and legal servitudes have given way to the idea of limitations on
ownership; as a result, in the legal systems of these two countries
all servitudes are conventional.3
In contrast with natural servitudes that arise from the natural
situation of estates and with legal servitudes that are imposed by
law, conventional or voluntary servitudes are established in Louisiana
"by juridical act, prescription, or destination of the owner."" The crea-
tion of conventional servitudes by juridical act has been dealt with
elsewhere.5 This study is devoted to an analysis of Louisiana law
governing the creation of conventional servitudes by prescription and
destination of the owner. For purposes of comparison, brief reference
will be made to French, German, and Greek law.
CREATION OF SERVITUDES BY PRESCRIPTION
Servitudes Created by Prescription
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of creation of servitudes in the
legal systems of most civil law jurisdictions; there are, however, im-
Copyright, 1982 by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* W.R. Irby Professor of Law, Tulane University.
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 654 (as revised in 1977); LA. CIV. CODE art. 659 (repealed in
1977); LA. CIv. CODE art. 655 (1825); LA. DIGEST OF 1808, bk. II, tit. IV, art. 3; FRENCH CIV.
CODE art. 639 (J. Crabb trans. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FRENCH CIV. CODE]. In 1977 the
Louisiana Civil Code articles governing predial servitudes were revised. See 1977 La.
Acts, No. 514, S 1. Throughout this article, references to the current version of the
Civil Code articles will contain no date.
2. See FRENCH CIV. CODE, bk. II, tit. IV, ch. 3 ("Servitudes Established by the Deed
of Man").
3. See G. BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 321 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek); H. WOLFF-RAISER,
SACHENRECHT 441 (10th ed. 1957).
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 654. Predial servitudes may not be acquired by estoppel.
Greene v. Greene, 373 So. 2d 756 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
5. See Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes: Creation by Title, 45 TUL. L. REV. 459
(1971).
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portant differences among these legal systems.' For example, in
Greece, all kinds of servitudes may be created by prescription; in
France, only continuous and apparent servitudes may be so created.
In Louisiana and in Italy, prescription avails as to apparent servitudes
only. In Germany and in other countries having a land register system,
servitudes may not be created by prescription without an entry into
the land register.
Louisiana
Under the regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, only con-
tinuous and apparent servitudes could be created by prescription.'
Discontinuous servitudes (even if apparent) and nonapparent servitudes
(even if continuous) could not be created by prescription; they could
only be created by title.8
The 1977 revision broadened the availability of acquisitive prescrip-
tion by dispensing with the requirement of continuity. According to
revised article 740 of the Civil Code, apparent servitudes may be
created by prescription, even though they may have been considered
discontinuous and therefore insusceptible of creation by prescription
under the 1870 Code.' Thus, in contrast with the 1870 Code, a right
6. For a comparative study, see Comment, Acquisitive Prescription of Servitudes,
15 LA. L. REV. 777 (1955).
7. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 765 (repealed in 1977) & 3504 (repealed in 1979); Viering
v. N.K. Fairbanks Co., 156 La. 592, 100 So. 729 (1924); Acadia-Vermilion Rice Irrigating
Co. v. Broussard, 175 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). Political subdivisions could
also acquire continuous and apparent servitudes on the lands of private persons. See
Dugas v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 351 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
A conventional servitude of drain, contrary to the natural servitude of drain, may
be established by acquisitive prescription. The prescription commences to run from
the day works contrary to the natural servitude cause a change in the flow of water.
The works may be erected by anyone on the dominant, the servient, or even a third
estate. See Johnson v. Wills, 220 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), writ refused 254
La. 132, 222 So. 2d 883 (1969).
8. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 766 (repealed in 1977); Nash v. Whitten, 326 So. 2d 856
(La. 1976); Ogborn v. Lower Terrebone Ref. & Mfg. Co., 129 La. 379, 56 So. 323 (1911);
Fisk v. Haber, 7 La. Ann. 652 (1852); Comment, Acquisition of Rights of Way by Prescrip-
tion, 12 TUL. L. REV. 226 (1938).
9. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 740, comment (a). For the definition of apparent servitudes,
see LA. CIV. CODE art. 707. The works and constructions that are exterior signs of a ser-
vitude may be on the servient estate or on the dominant estate. However, such works
and constructions must be made in the place in which the servitude is exercised, and
they must be visible by the owner of the servient estate. 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT,
TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS-SERVITUDES no 964 (Picard 2d ed. 1952).
According to article 3485 of the Louisiana Civil Code (as revised in 1982), all private
things are susceptible of acquisitive prescription. Further, according to comment (b)
of article 723 (as revised in 1977) servitudes may not be established on public things
by prescription.
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of passage exercised over a railroad track, a paved road, or any other
construction regarded as an exterior sign of a servitude may be
created by prescription. However, article 740 may not be applied
retroactively. Therefore, the possession of a servitude that would be
discontinuous under the 1870 Code does not give rise to prescriptive
rights except from the effective date of the new legislation.0
A prescription that commenced to run prior to the effective date
of the new legislation for the acquisition of a servitude that would
be classified as continuous and apparent under the prior law continues
to run under the new legislation. Upon accrual of the prescription
in such a situation, the right acquired will be an apparent servitude."
France
The provisions of the Code Civil concerning creation of servitudes
by prescription reflect a compromise of conflicting customs. Accord-
ing to the Custom of Paris, no servitude could be created by prescrip-
tion, whereas according to the customs of most regions, all kinds of
servitudes could be created by prescription. Under the circumstances,
the redactors of the Code Napoleon opted for an intermediary solu-
tion that was supported by certain customs: acquisitive prescription
was accepted only as to continuous and apparent servitudes.
The compromise has been criticized by doctrinal writers as lack-
ing "rational foundation."" The requirement that a servitude be ap-
parent, that is, evidenced by an exterior sign, has been termed a
"useless rigor."1 The general requirement that for acquisitive prescrip-
tion the adverse possession must be open and public ought to suffice."
For example, a servitude for the drawing of water or for pasturage
ought to satisfy the requirement of open and public possession, if ex-
ercised in broad daylight. However, such a servitude may not be
created by prescription in France because it is classified in the Code
Civil as discontinuous."
10. See Daniel v. Department of Transp. and Dev., 396 So. 2d 967 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1981); Greene v. Greene, 373 So. 2d 756 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
11. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 740, comment (a); cf. Wild v. LeBlanc, 191 So. 2d 146 (La.
App. 3rd Cir. 1966) (drainage ditch); Acadia-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co. v. Broussard,
175 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1965) (irrigation canal); Dugas v. St. Martin Parish
Police Jury, 351 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1977) (drainage ditch); Fuller v. Washington,
19 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944) (sewer line; exterior signs).
12. See CUSTOM OF PARIS art. 186 (1510); 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9,
no 956 & 957.
13. 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 956.
14. Id. at no 956.2.
15. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3476 (as revised in 1982); FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2229.
16. See FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 688. It was the same under article 727 of the Loui-
siana Civil Code of 1870.
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The requirement that the servitude be continuous is even less
justifiable. According to medieval scholars, discontinuous servitudes
could not be created by prescription because such servitudes were
considered to be insusceptible of continuous possession, a requirement
for acquisitive prescription. However, modern writers have discarded
this explanation as theoretically faulty. As a matter of fact, for pur-
poses of acquisitive prescription, discontinuous servitudes are as much
susceptible of continuous possession as corporeal immovables. Thus,
the regular use of a servitude for the drawing of water is as much
a continuous possession of the servitude as possession of the body
of water itself and the regular use of a servitude of passage is as
much a continuous possession of the right of way as adverse posses-
sion of the strip of land itself.17
Certain authors later proposed another explanation for the require-
ment that the servitude be continuous. Discontinuous servitudes may
not be created by prescription because they are used by means of
isolated acts that are insufficient to give notice to the owner of the
would-be servient estate; therefore, such acts must be regarded as
tolerated in the spirit of good neighborhood. This explanation is equally
unacceptable, because it is based on the unrealistic presumption that
in the absence of title, the possession of a discontinuous servitude
is necessarily precarious.' 8
Greece
Aware of the criticism addressed to the system of the Code Civil,
the redactors of the Greek Civil Code resolved the question of ac-
quisitive prescription of servitudes by application of the general rules
governing acquisitive prescription of immovables. 9 Thus, in Greece,
all kinds of servitudes, continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonap-
parent, and affirmative or negative, may be acquired by prescription.
Germany
The institution of acquisitive prescription is severely circumscribed
in Germany because the idea of acquisition of ownership and of other
real rights by possession during a certain period of time is incompati-
ble with the land register system."0 On principle, predial servitudes
may never be acquired by possession alone. However, if there is an
entry into the land register purporting to establish a predial servitude
17. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, n0 956.2.
18. Id. at n* 957.
19. See GREEK CIV. CODE arts. 1121, 1123; cf. GREEK CIv. CODE arts. 1041-1055. G.
BALIS, supra note 4, at 324.
20. See STULZ, Dienstbarkeiten, in 2 RECHTSVERGLEICHENDES HANDWOERTERBUCH 645,
650 (1929).
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and the owner of the dominant estate has used the servient estate for
thirty years in accordance with his title, a predial servitude is established.2
However, this only happens in exceptional circumstances."
Creation of Servitudes of Light and View by Prescription
There has been much confusion in Louisiana concerning the modes
of creation of servitudes of light and view and, especially, the crea-
tion of those servitudes by acquisitive prescription. For this reason,
analysis of legislation, jurisprudence, and doctrine governing the crea-
tion of servitudes of light and view is undertaken at this point.
Servitude of Light
Article 703 of the Louisiana Civil CIode declares that the servitude
of light is the right by which the owner of the dominant estate is
entitled to make openings in a common wall for the admission of light.
Further, the article provides that the owner of the servient estate
is prevented from making an obstruction in a common wall which will
deny light to the owner of the dominant estate.' This provision defines
the servitude of light narrowly, in conformity with the law governing
common enclosures. A servitude of light, however, may also be
established on a private wall.2"
On a common wall, a servitude of light may be established by
title, informal destination of the owner, or acquisitive prescription.
An opening in a common wall is an exterior sign of a servitude because
a co-owner of such a wall is forbidden to make any openings without
the consent of the other co-owner.25 Thus, the servitude of light in
a common wall is by definition apparent and, under the 1977 revision,
may be acquired by informal destination of the owner or by
prescription." Such a servitude could also have been acquired by
21. See BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] arts. 900(2) & 1029 (W. Ger.). These re-
quirements promote certainty of titles. See KOHLER, BEITRAEGE ZUM SERVITUTENRECHT,
in 87 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 157, 247 (1897). For adverse criticism, see 2
0. GIERKE, DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 646 (1905).
22. The owner of the servient estate has thirty years to bring an action for cor-
rection of the land register. See BGB art. 894.
23. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 703. This provision reproduces that part of article 717 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 dealing with the servitude of light. It does not change
the law.
24. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 915; 5 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE,
TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL no 1015 (Chauveau 2d ed. 1899); G. BALIS,
supra note 3, at 316.
25. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 681.
26. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 707 ("a window in a common wall"); LA. CIV. CODE art. 740;
Note, Adjoining Landouwers-Right to Light and Air, 34 TUL. L. REV. 599 (1960).
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destination of the owner or by prescription under the regime of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, because it was considered to be apparent
and continuous."
In contrast, a servitude of light in a private wall may not be
established by prescription' or by informal destination of the owner.'
In Louisiana, the owner of a private wall is free to make as many
openings in his wall as he sees fit; such openings are a prerogative
of ownership rather than exterior signs of a servitude. 0 A servitude
of light in a private wall is thus a nonapparent servitude involving
exclusively the prohibition of construction that obstructs the light.
Such a servitude must be acquired by title"' or by a formal declara-
tion of destination.2
When a servitude of light is established by title, by destination
of the owner, or by acquisitive prescription, the owner of the ser-
vient estate may still erect constructions on his estate because the
servitude of light does not involve an absolute prohibition of building;
the owner is only prevented from raising constructions that obstruct
the light.33
27. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 715, 727, 728 (repealed in 1977). There are no reported
decisions involving application of these provisions for the acquisition of a servitude
of light in a common wall by destination of the owner or by acquisitive prescription.
In Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1883), the court recognized the existence of
a servitude of light in a private wall, established by destination of the owner. However,
in Ribet v. Howard, 109 La. 113, 33 So. 103 (1902), the court correctly held that a
servitude of light in a private wall is nonapparent and cannot be acquired by prescrip-
tion or destination of the owner.
Until 1825, a landowner did not have an unlimited right to make openings in his
wall; hence, one could acquire a servitude of light in his own wall by destination or
by prescription. The existence of an opening in a private wall was an apparent sign
of servitude. See Cleris v. Tieman, 15 La. Ann. 316 (1860) (destination of the owner);
Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407 (1846) (destination of the owner). A fortiori, the
co-owner of a common wall could acquire by destination or by prescription a servitude
of light in the common wall. Lavillebeuvre v. Cosgrove, 13 La. Ann. 323 (1858).
28. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 740 & 742.
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 741(1).
30. See Ribet v. Howard, 109 La. 113, 33 So. 103 (1902); Bryant v. Sholars, 104
La. 786, 29 So. 350 (1901); Oldstein v. Firemen's Bldg. Ass'n, 44 La. Ann. 492, 10 So.
928 (1892). Conversely, the boarding of windows in a private wall may not be con-
sidered as an exterior sign of a'servitude of prohibition of light. See Lavillebeuvre
v. Cosgrove, 13 La. Ann. 323 (1858). The prohibition of light is a nonapparent ser-
vitude. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 704 & 707.
31. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 707(2) & 739.
32. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 741(2) (as amended by 1978 La. Acts. No. 479).
33. See Goodwin v. Alexander, 105 La. 658, 30 So. 102 (1901). The servitude of
light is less onerous than the servitude of view. For the distinction between the ser-
vitude of light and the servitude of view, see Judgmetot of Jan. 28, 1925, Cour de
Cassation. Requites [Cass. req.] Paris, Gaz. Pal. 1925.1.650;,Judgment of March 16, 1932,
Angers, Gaz. Pal. 1932.2.87.
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Servitude of View
Article 701 of the Louisiana Civil Code defines the servitude of
view as the right by which the owner of the dominant estate enjoys
a view and the owner of the servient estate is prevented from rais-
ing constructions that obstruct the view.' The question then arising
is whether this servitude may be acquired without title.
When the view is exercised through windows or other openings
in a wall, the argument may be made that the servitude is apparent
and that it may be acquired by prescription or informal destination
of the owner. However, windows or other openings in one's own wall
are not exterior signs of a servitude; they are the exercise of a
prerogative of ownership." Only windows or other openings in a com-
mon wall constitute exterior signs of a servitude. It follows that a
servitude of view in a private wall is a nonapparent servitude that
must be established by title or by formal declaration of destination
and that a servitude of view in a common wall is an apparent ser-
vitude that may be established by title, informal destination, or
prescription.
According to article 727 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the
servitude of view was continuous, and according to article 728 of the
same code, an opening in a wall, such as a window or a door, was
an exterior sign that qualified the servitude as apparent." Hence it
was assumed that the servitude of view was always continuous and
apparent. 8 Sight was lost of the fact that the servitude of view was
apparent only when it was established on a common wall and was
nonapparent when it was established on a private wall.
This error may be easily explained. Article 728 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 was the same as article 52 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808 and article 689 of the French Civil Code. Under articles
43 and 44 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, corresponding with
articles 676 and 677 of the French Civil Code, an owner did not have
an unlimited right to have openings in a private wall adjoining a
34. LA. CiV. CODE art. 701. This provision reproduces that part of article 716 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 dealing with the servitude of view. It does not change
the law. The servitude of view, as defined in article 701, need not be exercised through
openings in walls. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 701, comment (b).
35. See Bryant v. Sholars, 104 La. 786, 29 So. 350 (1901). See also Ribet v. Howard,
109 La. 113, 33 So. 103 (1902); Goodwin v. Alexander, 105 La. 658, 30 So. 102 (1901);
Oldstein v. Firemen's Bldg. Ass'n, 44 La. Ann. 492, 10 So. 928 (1892); Jeannin v. DeBlanc,
11 La. Ann. 465 (1856). Conversely, the boarding of windows is not an apparent sign
of a servitude of prohibition of view. Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1883).
36. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 707(1).
37. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 727 & 728 (repealed in 1977).
38. See Lieber v. Rust, 398 So. 2d 519 (La. 1981).
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neighboring estate. Hence a door or window in a private wall could
be an exterior sign of a servitude. However, articles 43 and 44 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 were supressed in the 1825 revision;39
owners from then on had the right to make openings in private walls
as they saw fit. The declaration in article 728 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870 that openings in a wall were exterior signs of an ap-
parent servitude was thus accurate as to common walls only.
There has been much confusion in Louisiana jurisprudence con-
cerning the scope of the servitude of view and its relation to the ser-
vitude of prohibition of building (or servitude of prospect). Dicta
abounded that the servitude of view was continuous and apparent and,
therefore, could be acquired by title, destination of the owner, or
prescription."0 However, the same decisons also declared that the ser-
vitude of view did not include as an accessory a prohibition of building
unless the servitude of view was created by title." Thus, presumably,
if a servitude of view had been created by destination of the owner
or by prescription, the neighbor would have the right to raise con-
structions and block the view.
These decisions gave a restricted application to article 716 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, according to which the servitude of view
included "the power of preventing one's neighbor from raising any
buildings which obstruct it."'2 This provison applied to servitudes of
view established by title; it was thought to be inapplicable to ser-
vitudes of view established by destination of the owner or by prescrip-
tion. The net result was that according to dicta, a servitude of view
established by destination of the owner or by prescription was devoid
of meaning.
These seemingly contradictory decisions may be reconciled on the
ground that a servitude of view could be acquired on a private wall
by title only.43 Such a servitude was continuous but nonapparent, and
it could not be acquired by destination of the owner or by
prescription."' However, the servitude of view on a common wall was
39. See Jeannin v. DeBlanc, 11 La. Ann. 465 (1856); 1 Louisiana Legal Archives,
PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, at 73 (1937).
40. See Lieber v. Rust, 398 So. 2d 519 (La. 1981), and cases cited therein.
41. See id.; Bernos v. Canepa, 114 La. 517, 38 So. 438 (1905). But see Barton v.
Kirkman, 5 Rob. 16 (1843).
42. LA. CIv. CODE art. 716 (repealed in 1977).
43. See Bernos v. Canepa, 114 La. 517, 38 So. 438 (1905); cf. Parish v. Municipality
No. 2, 8 La. Ann. 145 (1853); French v. New Orleans C. R. Co., 2 La. Ann. 80 (1847).
44. See Ribet v. Howard, 109 La. 113, 33 So. 103 (1902); Goodwin v. Alexander,
105 La. 658, 30 So. 102 (1901); Bryant v. Sholars, 104 La. 786, 29 So. 350 (1901); Old-
stein v. Firemen's Bldg. Ass'n, 44 La. Ann. 492, 10 So. 928 (1892); Taylor v. Boulware,
35 La. Ann. 469 (1883); Jeannin v. DeBlanc, 11 La. Ann. 465 (1856).
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apparent and continuous, 5 and it could be acquired by title, destina-
tion of the owner,'6 or prescription. 7
When the servitude of view is established, whether by prescrip-
tion or otherwise, the owner of the servient estate may not raise con-
structions that block the view.'8 However, the servitude of view is
not the same as the servitude of prohibition of building. The servitude
of prohibition of building is much more onerous; it prevents the owner
of the servient estate from raising any construction on his estate,
rather than merely preventing the owner from raising constructions
that obstruct the view. 9
45. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 716, 727, & 728 (repealed in 1977).
46. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 767 (repealed in 1977); cf Cleris v. Tieman, 15 La. Ann.
316 (1860); Lavillebeuvre v. Cosgrove, 13 La. Ann. 323 (1858). See note 27, supra.
47. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 765 (repealed in 1977); Note, supra note 26, at 599.
There is a servitude of view which consists in having openings or windows for
prospect on the estate of another person, and which prevents the owner of the
servient estate from obstructing the view by raising buildings. There has never
been any doubt that such a servitude may be established by title. According to
the Code Civil it may also be established by prescription.
8 C. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 83-84 (1876).
48. The servitude of view established by thirty years possession has the same
effects as the one established by title, because the law places the two modes
of acquisition on the same line. There is no reason whatever to draw a distinc-
tion between the effects of the servitude of view according to the mode of its
acquisition, by title or by prescription. In both cases, we must apply the provi-
sion of Article 701 which provides: 'The owner of the estate which owes the ser-
vitude can do nothing tending to diminish its use, or to make it more inconve-
nient.' Thus, when the servitude of view is established by prescription, the owner
of the servient estate can no longer obstruct the view by building anything. Such
is the theory of the Code ...
8 C. LAURENT, supra note 47, at 84.
49. What is the extent of the charge that burdens the servient estate? But the
very nature of the servitude implies that the owner of the servient estate cannot
obstruct the view by raising constructions on his estate; according to Article 701
he cannot do anything that diminishes the use of the servitude or that renders
it more inconvenient; thus, he cannot build in such a manner as to prevent the
owner of the dominant estate from using his right. But in what does this right
consist? First of all, to receive light and air, and to look out: the owner of the
servient estate may not interfere with the enjoyment of these rights. Does it
mean that he cannot build at all? No, because the servitude of view is not the
prohibition of building (servitude of prospect), it is not incompatible with the right
of the neighbor to build on his property. Nevertheless, this right is restricted
by the servitude of view. The difficulty is to determine the precise limits: in what
distance from the dominant estate may the owner of the servient estate build?
... Definitively, there is no legal provision on this point, since Article 678 has
another purpose. There remains Article 701, the application of which is a matter
of fact.
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Acquisition of Additional Rights by Prescription
The owner of the dominant estate may make a more extensive
use of a servitude than that granted by title or established by prescrip-
tion. In such a case, the question arises whether the owner of the
dominant estate may acquire additional rights by prescription.
Article 760 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that a more ex-
tensive use of the servitude than that granted by the title does not
result in the acquisition of additional rights for the dominant estate
"unless it be by acquisitive prescription.""0 This provision refers to
apparent servitudes and must be applied in combination with article
740 of the Civil Code 1 -the additional rights acquired can be only
extensions of the scope or manner of use of an apparent servitude.
Thus one who enjoys a servitude of light in a common wall may ac-
quire by prescription the right to have additional openings, and one
who enjoys a servitude for passage on foot on a paved road may ac-
quire by prescription the additional right to pass on horseback or in
a vehicle. 2 However, one who enjoys a nonapparent servitude, such
as a prohibition of light or of view, cannot acquire additional rights
by prescription. In all these cases, the additional rights must be
themselves susceptible of acquisition by prescription, that is, they must
be rights that could form the object of an apparent servitude.
Prescriptive Periods
In Louisiana, the prescriptive periods for the acquisition of an ap-
parent servitude are ten years, if the possessor is in good faith and
has just title, and thirty years, if the possessor is in bad faith or has
no just title.5
50. LA. CiV. CODE art. 760. This provision is new. It is based in part on article 797
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. It changes the law as it allows acquisition by
prescription of additional apparent servitudes, even though they might be considered
as discontinuous under the prior law and therefore insusceptible of acquisition by
prescription. There is no corresponding provision in the French Civil Code. However,
article 708 of the Code Civil, corresponding with article 796 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, has been interpreted in France to mean that additional apparent and
continuous servitudes may be acquired by prescription. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT,
supra note 9, no 959.
In Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 1110, 262 So. 2d 339 (La. 1972), the court refrained from
deciding whether the existence of a conventional servitude precludes the acquisition
by prescription of a different or more extensive servitude. The court noted, however,
that there is French authority for an affirmative answer to this question and that
articles 797 and 800 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 lead to the same answer.
51. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 740.
52. Cf. LA. CiV. CODE art. 707; 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 959.
53. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 742. Cf. GREEK CIV. CODE arts. 1121 & 1123 (ten and twenty
years); G. BALIS, supra note 3, at 324.
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For purposes of acquisitive prescription, good faith is defined in
article 3480 of the Louisiana Civil Code." As applied to servitudes,
this provision requires that the possessor honestly believe that he
is entitled to the right he exercises." Good faith is always presumed;
accordingly, the person who alleges that the possessor is in bad faith
has the burden of proof of his allegation." Whether good faith may
exist in the absence of just title is at best questionable; even if good
faith does exist, it does not alone suffice for the acquisition of a ser-
vitude by the prescription of ten years.
Just title is defined in article 3483 of the Louisiana Civil Code.58
As applied to servitudes, this provision requires that the possessor
have a title that would have established a servitude if it had been
granted by the owner of the servient estate. The title should not be
confused with the written instrument. For purposes of acquisitive
prescription of servitudes, the requisite just title, under the regime
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, could be oral, as it was provable
by parol evidence.59
Under the regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, controver-
sy existed as to the applicable period of prescription. Article 765 of
that code declared that "continuous and apparent servitudes [could]
be acquired by title, or by possession of ten years,""0 and article 3504
54. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3480 (as revised in 1982). Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3451 (re-
pealed in 1982):
The possessor in good faith is he who has just reason to believe himself the master
of the thing which he possesses, although he may not be in fact; as happens to
him who buys a thing which he supposes to belong to the person selling it to
him, but which, in fact, belongs to another.
55. See Kennedy v. Succession of McCollam, 34 La. Ann. 568 (1882).
56. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3481 (as revised in 1982); Nuckolls v. Louisiana State
Highway Dept., 337 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
57. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 742. It was otherwise under the regime of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870. According to one line of Louisiana decisions, a predial servitude
could be acquired by ten years prescription without just title; only "simple or moral
good faith" was necessary. Blanda v. Rivers, 210 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
58. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 (as revised in 1982). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3484
(repealed in 1982):
By the term just title, in cases of prescription, we do not understand that which
the possessor may have derived from the true owner, for then no true prescrip-
tion would be necessary, but a title which the possessor may have received from
any person whom he honestly believed to be the real owner, provided the title
were such as to transfer the ownership of the property'.
59. See Kennedy v. Succession of McCollam, 34 La. Ann. 568 (1882); Guesnard v.
Executors of Bird, 33 La. Ann. 796 (1881); Vincent v. Michel, 7 La. 52 (1834); Blanda
v. Rivers, 210 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Greco v. Frigerio, 3 La. App. 649
(Orl. Cir. 1926).
60. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 765 (repealed in 1979). This provision was derived from
the 1825 revision. The Louisiana Digest of 1808 provided that "perpetual and apparent
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of the same code declared that "a continuous apparent servitude [was]
acquired by possession and the enjoyment of the right for thirty years
uninterruptedly, even without title or good faith."61 The interpreta-
tion and application of these provisions gave rise to doctrinal
arguments and conflicting judicial determinations.62 According to one
line of decisions, a continuous and apparent servitude could be ac-
quired by ten years possession even if the possessor was in bad faith
and had no title. 3 This interpretation, in effect, wrote article 3504
out of the Civil Code. According to a second line of decisions, a con-
tinuous and apparent servitude could be acquired by ten years posses-
sion if the possessor was in good faith, even though he had no title. 4
According to a third line of decisions, the possessor had to have just
title and had to be in good faith in order to acquire a servitude by
ten years possession; in the absence of either good faith or just title,
the servitude could be acquired by thirty years possession only. The
third line of decisions, which began with the Louisiana Supreme Court
decison in Kennedy v. Succession of McCollam,5 provided the correct
interpretation.
In France, the ownership of an immovable may be acquired by
servitudes [could] be acquired by title or by a possession of thirty years." LA. DIGEST
OF 1808, bk. II, tit. IV, art. 53. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 provided that "continuous
and apparent servitudes [could] be acquired by title or by possession of ten years,
if the parties [were] present, and twenty years if absent." LA. CIv. CODE art. 761 (1825).
The "if' clause was suppressed in the 1870 revision, as was the "twenty years" clause.
61. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3504 (repealed in 1979). This provision was likewise derived
from the 1825 revision. See 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE
OF 1825, at 409 (1937). For applications, see Viering v. N.K. Fairbanks Co., 156 La. 592,
100 So. 729 (1924) (post supporting a guywire); Acadia-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co.
v. Broussard, 175 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (irrigation canal).
62. See Comment, supra note 6. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted an applica-
tion for writ in the case of Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 1110, 262 So. 2d 339 (1972) to
determine this matter. The question, however, was not raised under the facts and
pleadings and the court wisely avoided determination by way of dicta. See Yiannopoulos,
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Property, 33 LA.
L. REV. 172 (1973).
63. See Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 39 La. Ann. 210 (1887) (drain); Guesnard v. Ex-
ecutors of Bird, 33 La. Ann. 796 (1881) (drain); Vincent v. Michel, 7 La. 52 (1834) (drip);
Dugas v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 351 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (drain);
Nuckolls v. Louisiana State Highway Dept. 337 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976)
(drain); Johnson v. Wills, 220 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (drain); Blanda v. Rivers,
210 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) (plumbing and other installations); Wild v.
LeBlanc, 191 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) (drain); Hale v. Hulin, 130 So. 2d 519
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) (drain); Fuller v. Washington, 19 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1944) (sewer).
64. See, e.g., Blanda v. Rivers, 210 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); cf. Nuckolls
v. Louisiana State Highway Dept., 337 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
65. 34 La. Ann. 568 (1882). See also Greco v. Frigerio, 3 La. App. 649 (Orl. Cir.
1926); cf. Randazzo v. Lucas, 106 So. 2d 490 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958).
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prescription in ten, twenty, or thirty years. According to article 2265
of the Code Civil, an adverse possessor in good faith and under just
title acquires the ownership of an immovable by prescription in ten
years if the real owner resides in the district of the court of appeal
in whose jurisdiction the immovable is situated. Ownership is acquired
in twenty years if the owner is domiciled out of that district and
possession is in good faith and under just title. Further, according
to article 2262 of the same code, an adverse possessor acquires the
ownership of an immovable by prescription in thirty years regardless
of his good faith or just title.
With respect to servitudes, article 690 of the Code Civil declares
that continuous and apparent servitudes are acquired by title or by
possession of thirty years. There is no provision corresponding to that
of article 2265 and no affirmative indication that servitudes may also
be acquired in ten or twenty years if the possessor is in good faith
and has just title. Article 2265 could, of course, be applied by analogy
to servitudes; however, the view has prevailed in France that ser-
vitudes may be acquired only by the prescription of thirty years and
that the good faith and just title of the possessor are immaterial."
The prevailing view is grounded on a celebrated decision of the
Court of Paris which declared that article 690 of the Code Civil was
drafted in order to exclude acquisition of servitudes in either ten or
twenty years. 7 However, it has been convincingly demonstrated that
this was not the purpose of article 690. This article was actually
adopted in order to abrogate those rules of the Custom of Paris and
of the Custom of Orleans according to which no servitude could be
acquired without title. 8 The redactors of the Code Civil were think-
ing merely of the situation in which the servient estate is in the hands
of the true owner; the redactors wished to supress the requirement
that the possessor of the servitude should have a title. They were
not thinking of the situation in which the servient estate is in the
hands of an adverse possessor who without right grants a servitude,
because under prerevolutionary law, a person who had title from an
adverse possessor of the servient estate could acquire the servitude
by prescription.
The preferable view is that article 2265 of the Code Civil ought
to apply by analogy to the acquisition of a continuous and apparent
servitude by prescription. In order to exclude application of this pro-
66. See C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no 251 (5th ed. 1900); 12 C.
DEMOLOMBE, TRAITE DES SERVITUDES no 283 (1855); 8 C. LAURENT, supra note 48, at 234.
67. Judgment of Aug. 25, 1834, Cour d'Appel, Paris, D.1835.2.1, S.1835.2.134.
68. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 965.
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vision by analogy, exception ought to have been established by an
express legislative text. Moreover, there is no rational justification
for application of the prescription of ten or twenty years to owner-
ship but not to its dismemberments. 9
Requisite Possession for Prescription
For the acquisition of servitudes by prescription, article 742 of
the Louisiana Civil Code requires either "peaceable and uninterrupted
possession ... for ten years in good faith and by just title" or "uninter-
rupted possession for thirty years without title or good faith."7
However, these are not the only attributes of the requisite posses-
sion. The first sentence of article 742 declares that the laws govern-
ing prescription of immovables apply to apparent servitudes; thus the
attributes of possession are those of article 3475 for the ten-years
prescription and those of article 3486 for the thirty-years prescription.7 1
In all cases, the possessor must have the corpus and the animus,72
the possession must be uninterrupted, and the possession must be
free of vice, that is, it must be continuous, public, peaceable, and
unequivocal.
73
Moreover, the possession must be adverse; it must be an
unauthorized use that infringes on -the ownership of the servient
estate. One who merely exercises a right has nothing to prescribe.7,
Thus one who makes an opening in his own wall acquires neither a
servitude of light nor a servitude of view, because he merely exer-
cises a prerogative of ownership. 75 He may be forced to close the open-
ing if the neighbor exercises his right to make the wall common.76
However, if a co-owner of a common wall makes openings in the wall,
he infringes on the rights of his co-owner;' if the openings are allow-
ed to remain for over thirty years, he acquires by prescription a ser-
vitude of light or a servitude of view.7 1
69. Id. at no 965.
70. LA. CIv. CODE art. 742.
71. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3475 & 3486 (as revised in 1982); LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3487
& 3500 (repealed in 1982).
72. LA. CirV. CODE art. 3424 (as revised in 1982); A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROP-
ERTY S 211 (2d ed. 1980); 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 960.
73. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3434 & 3435 (as revised in 1982).
74. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 960.
75. See text at notes 30 & 36, supra.
76. See Yiannopoulos, Common Walls, Fences, and Ditches: Louisiana and Com-
parative Law, 35 LA. L. REV. 1249, 1281 (1975).
77. Id. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 681.
7,8. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 740 & 3486 (as revised in 1982).
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Precariousness
One who exercises possession over a thing on behalf of another
or with the permission of the owner is a precarious possessor."9 Such
a possessor may acquire neither ownership nor a servitude by prescrip-
tion. Thus one who uses a servitude of passage by virtue of a lease
granted to him by the owner of the dominant estate may not acquire
by prescription the servitude of passage for himself, and one who uses
an aqueduct with the express or tacit permission of the owner of the
estate on which the aqueduct is located may not, by prescription, ac-
quire a servitude of aqueduct. The owner of the estate on which the
passage or aqueduct is located may tolerate certain invasions in the
spirit of good neighborhood or in the pursuit of his own interests;
in neither case is he presumed to have consented to a servitude.
Moreover, the person who encroached on the rights of the landowner
with his express or tacit permission does not have the intent to ac-
quire a servitude; he implicitly recognized that the ownership of the
estate is unencumbered and that prescription does not run in his
favor."
Article 3490 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, corresponding
with article 2322 of the French Civil Code, declared that acts of simple
tolerance could not be the foundation of either possession or
79. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3437, 3438 & 3477 (as revised in 1982); FRENCH CIV. CODE
art. 2236; McCormick v. La. & N.W. R. Co., 109 La. 764, 33 So. 762 (1903) (license
to occupy land for railroad purposes; no servitude); Macheca v. Avegno, 20 La. Ann.
339 (1868) (drain); Macheca v. Avegno, 25 La. Ann. 55 (1873) (drain). But see Blanda
v. Rivers, 210 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). In this case, the court erroneously
held that installations on a common wall, made with the permission of a co-owner,
resulted in the acquisition of a servitude by prescription. The holding was founded
on the assumption that "the precariousness of title based upon permission referred
to in this article [3490 of the 1870 Code], applicable to ownership, cannot by analogy
be extended to predial servitudes." 210 So. 2d at 166.
Under certain circumstances, the "permission" of the owner of the servient estate
could be, in reality, an oral title for the creation of a servitude. See Greco v. Frigerio,
3 La. App. 649 (Orl. Cir. 1926). Such a title was provable by parol evidence.
See also 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 960; Judgment of Dec. 20, 1871,
Dijon, S.1872.2.72; Judgment of Dec. 20, 1906, Besancon, S.1907.2.298.
80. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 961. A precarious possessor
may change the nature of his possession by taking a title from a third person. See
LA. CIv. CODE art. 3478 (as revised in 1982); FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 2238. However, accord-
ing to French doctrine and jurisprudence, article 2238 of the Code Civil does not
apply to the precarious possessor of a servitude. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra;
25 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 222 (Tissier
3d ed. 1905); 2 C. AUBRY ETC. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 5 136 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
in C. LAZARUS, 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 83 (1966).
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prescription.8 ' The purpose of this self-evident provision is to max-
imize the use of immovable property in the general interest. If acts
of simple tolerance were to be considered as acts of adverse posses-
sion, landowners would be compelled to object to innocent or occa-
sional invasions for fear that their lands would be burdened with
predial servitudes.
The vice of precarious possession is relative. Thus one's posses-
sion may be precarious vis-a-vis the owner who has tacitly or expressly
given permission for the use of his estate but it may be adverse
toward third persons.2
Acquisition by Prescription of Ownership or of Servitude
An adverse possessor of a part or of the whole of an estate may
acquire by acquisitive prescription ownership or merely a servitude.
Thus one who uses a part of the estate of another as a passage may
acquire either the ownership of the strip of land or a servitude of
passage; one who uses an estate for the grazing of cattle may acquire
the ownership of that bstate or merely a servitude of pasturage.
Whether ownership or a servitude is acquired by prescription depends
on the particular facts and circumstances.
When one possesses under a title, the right he acquires is deter-
mined by the title. If the title is translative of ownership, the adverse
possessor acquires the ownership of the land he has possessed; if the
title purports to establish a servitude, the adverse possessor acquires
a servitude. In the latter case, the adverse possessor of the servitude
is regarded as a precarious possessor vis-a-vis the owner of the ser-
vient estate;83 therefore, unless he changes the nature of his posses-
81. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3490 (repealed in 1982). This provision declared: "The cir-
cumstances of having been in possession by the permission or through the indulgence
of another person, gives neither legal possession nor the right of prescribing." Plenty
has been lost in the translation from the French text of article 3456 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1825, which was identical to article 2232 of the Code Napoleon. Article
2232 stated, "Les acts de pure faculte, et ceux de simple tolerance, ne peuvent fonder
ni possession ni prescription" (acts that are the exercise of a prerogative, and those
of simple tolerance, cannot be the foundation of either possession or prescription).
82. See Judgment of March 6, 1855, Cass. civ. Ire, D.1855.1.82, S.1855.1.507; Judg-
ment of Jan. 3, 1877, Cass. Req., D.1877.1.14; 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note
9, no 961. But see 25 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, supra note 80, no 221.
83. See John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 126 La.
840, 854, 53 So. 22, 32 (La. 1910):
The person enjoying a servitude is a precarious possessor. No matter how
numerous may be the acts done by him animo domini, they cannot serve to show
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sion by overt and unambiguous acts that are sufficient to give notice
to the owner, he cannot acquire the ownership of the estate by
prescription."
However, one who has possessed a part of the whole of the estate
of another without title for thirty years will normally claim that he
has acquired ownership. If he were to claim that he had acquired a
servitude only, that servitude would have to have been apparent, and
under the regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, it would have
to have been continuous and apparent. Nonapparent servitudes can-
not, and under the regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 nonap-
parent or discontinuous servitudes could not, be acquired by
prescription. 5
In France, the nonavailability of prescription as to discontinuous
or nonapparent servitudes has had an unexpected result. Courts may
not declare that an adverse possessor has acquired by prescription
a servitude of passage, a servitude of pasturage, or a servitude for
the taking of water because such servitudes are discontinuous.
However, courts may declare, and usually do, that an adverse
possessor has acquired the ownership of the land he has used for more
than thirty years for passage, for pasturage, or for the taking of
water."
possession of the fee when the proof is made that the possession began by virtue
of a title which conferred only a right of servitude.
In Thevenet v. Clause, 302 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), holders of a right
of way servitude claimed that they possessed the land as owners. The court held tersely
that the acts of possession exercised by plaintiffs and their ancestors in title were
"consistent with their recorded title to a servitude of passage." In Journet v. Gerard,
173 So. 2d 263, 267 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), the court declared that the acts of posses-
sion were little more than the exercise of rights under the servitude, and in all prob-
abilities appeared to the owners of the land "as only a use of the servitude." See
also Culligan Water Conditioning, Inc. v. Heirs of Watson, 370 So. 2d 129 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1979) (railroad right of way; no adverse possession of ownership).
84. See John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 126 La.
840, 857, 53 So. 22, 34 (La. 1910):
The precarious possessor who acquires a title from a third person and desires
no longer to hold precariously but animo domini, cannot content himself with
simply continuing the old possession, without outward change, and rely simply
upon the bare fact of his new title and of its registry to inaugurate a new posses-
sion. He must give some outward sign, of a nature to let the owner know of
the intention to put an end to the old order and inaugurate the new.
85. See text at note 7, supra.
86. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, n, 957; Judgment of Feb. 7, 1883,
Cass. Req. D.1884.1.128, S.1884.1.320; Judgment of May 1, 1888, Cass. Req., D.1888.1.219,
S.1890.1.439; Judgment of Oct. 22, 1924, Cass. Civ. ire, Gaz. Pal. 1924.2.695. See also
3 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, supra note 66, n' 251.1.
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CREATION OF SERVITUDES BY DESTINATION OF THE OWNER
Definition of Destination
Destination of the owner is a mode of creation of servitudes aris-
ing out of the relationship between two parts of the same estate or
between two estates owned by the same person that would be an
apparent servitude if there were two estates belonging to different
owners. 7 As long as there is only one owner, there can be no ser-
vitude, because no one may have a servitude on his own property-
neminem rea sua servit.88 However, when the single estate is divided
or when the two estates cease to belong to the same owner, a predial
servitude may be created without an express agreement. This mode
of creation of servitudes forms the topic of the following discussion.
Nature of Destination
The destination of the owner appears to be a distinct mode for
the creation of apparent servitudes. However, according to French
doctrine, it is considered to be merely a variation of the creation of
servitudes by title.
The creation of servitudes by destination of the owner is grounded
on the idea that when the owner of two estates transfers one of them
to another person, there is a tacit agreement between the parties that
the existing relationship between the estates will be maintained." The
law simply recognizes and enforces this tacit agreement that is the
equivalent of a title." This explanation of destination conforms to
historical precedents of the institution,91 accounts for the jurispruden-
tial requirement that the common owner of the two estates must have
the intent to establish a servitude," and generally reflects the inter-
87. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 965; Marie-France Mialon, La
Servitude par destination du pere de famille, D.1974.Chr.15; Comment, Establishment
of Sertitudes by Destination, 8 LA. L. REv. 560 (1948).
88. See Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles: Louisiana and Com-
parative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, (1968).
89. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 966; Judgment of Apr. 9, 1900,
Cour d'appel, Agen, D.1907.2.196,
90. Article 767 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which was identical to article
692 of the French Civil Code, declared that, with respect to continuous and apparent
servitudes, "the destination made by the owner twas] equivalent to title." This language
has not been reproduced in the 1977 revision; however, the nature of destination has
not changed.
91. See CUSTOM OF PARS art. 91 (1510); but cf CUSTOM OF PARIS art. 216 (1580).
92. See Judgment of Apr. 15, 1872, Cass. Req., D.1872.1.415, S.1873.1.146; Judg-
ment of June 19, 1893, Cass. Req., D.1893.1.526, S.1893.1.340; Judgment of May 8, 1895,
Cass. Civ., S.1895.1.272; Judgment of Dec. 3, 1901, Cass. Req., D.1902.1.267. Cf note
118, infra.
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pretation given by French courts to article 694 of the Code Civil. 3
In Louisiana, article 741 of the Civil Code declares that when the
two estates between which there is a relationship of destination cease
to belong to the same owner, an apparent servitude comes into
existence of right "unless there is express provision to the contrary."'94
This language expresses the traditional idea that the creation of a
predial servitude by destination is grounded on a tacit agreement,
which, of course, may be rescinded by express provision to the con-
trary. As to nonapparent servitudes, article 741 of the Louisiana Civil
Code requires a formal declaration by the owner. Creation of the
nonapparent servitude is subject to the suspensive condition that the
two estates shall cease to belong to the same owner. As soon as the
condition happens, the servitude is created by title.
Kinds of Destination
In France, the destination of the owner is always informal. That
is, the relationship between the parts of the same estate or between
the two estates is established without any formal act. In Louisiana,
-however, the destination of the owner may be either formal or
informal.
A formal destination is established by a declaration filed for
registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the im-
movable property is situated. 6 An informal destination is established
by means of exterior signs that are sufficient to indicate the existence
of the relationship between the parts of the same estate or between
the two estates and the intent of the owner to establish a servitude.
Servitudes Created by Destination
Under the regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, only con-
tinuous and apparent servitudes could be created by destination of
the owner. Today, however, both apparent and nonapparent ser-
93. See FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 694; cf LA. CIv. CODE art. 769 (repealed in 1977).
94. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 (as revised in 1977 and amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.
479). For a decision on the question of whether the title of the dominant estate is
merchantable, see Papalia v. Harrison, 52 So. 2d 775 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
95. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 739 (as revised in 1977 and amended by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 479). The requirement of title under article 739 includes expressly a declaration
of destination under article 741.
96. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 (as revised in 1977 and amended by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 479).
97. See text at note 115, infra.
98. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 767-769 (repealed in 1977); Lotz v. Hurwitz, 174 La. 638,
141 So. 83 (1932); Bernos v. Canepa, 114 La. 517, 38 So. 438 (1905); Taylor v. Boulware,
35 La. Ann. 469 (1883); Cleris v. Tieman, 15 La. Ann. 316 (1860); Lavillebeuvre v.
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vitudes may be so created, and the classificaton of a servitude as
discontinuous under the prior law is immaterial.
In the absence of a contrary agreement, an apparent servitude
comes into existence of right as soon as two estates or two parts
of the same estate between which there is a relationship of destina-
tion cease to belong to the same owner.9 A nonapparent servitude
likewise comes into existence in the absence of a contrary agreement
when two estates or two parts of the same estate cease to belong
to the same owner, if that owner has taken care to file for registry
in the appropriate public records a formal declaration establishing the
destination. 1°  .
Article 741 of the Louisiana Civil Code may be taken to mean
that only a nonapparent servitude may be created by a formal destina-
tion, but there is no reason for such a restrictive interpretation. Ap-
parently, the redactors of this provision, thinking that an apparent
servitude would come into existence of right, felt that a formal declara-
tion of destination was unnecessary. An owner, however, has a
legitimate interest in avoiding uncertainty. Thus he may file a formal
declaration designed to establish an apparent servitude in the future.
In France, only apparent servitudes, whether continuous or discon-
tinuous, may be created by destination of the owner.' 1 In Germany,
the Civil Code contains no provision dealing with destination of the
owner, and doubts existed in the past as to whether a predial ser-
vitude could be created"0 ' without an agreement."3 However, in the
light of practical necessity, German courts have dispensed with the
requirement of agreement and have enforced unilateral juridical acts
Cosgrove, 13 La. Ann. 323 (1858); Durel v. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann. 407 (1846); Alexander
v. Boghel, 4 La. 312 (1832); Efner v. Ketteringham, 41 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1949). Discontinuous servitudes, such as servitudes of passage, could not be established
by destination. See Burgas v. Stoutz, 174 La. 586, 141 So. 67 (1932); Fisk v. Haber,
7 La. Ann. 652 (1852); Williams v. Colomb, 206 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968);
Kelly v. Pippitone, 12 La. App. 635, 126 So. 79 (Orl. Cir. 1930). For doctrinal controversies
concerning the requirements of destination under the prior law, see Comment, supra
note 87.
99. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 741 (as revised in 1977 and amended by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 479).
100. LA. CIv. CODE art. 741. The declaration of destination may be cancelled, of course,
by the owner of the estate prior to the transfer of the estate or of a part of it to
another person; it may also be cancelled at any time by agreement.
101. See FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 692-694; 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9,
no 967-972.
102. See Regelsberger, Gesetz und Rechtsanwendung, 58 JHERINGS JAHRBUECHER 146,
161 (1911).
103. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1901, Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen, Hamburg, 1901 [R.G.Z.]
47, 202, 204; Oberlandes-gericht Hamburg, [O.L.G.l 1, 427. Cf. 0. GIERKE, supra note
21, at 641.
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establishing servitudes on one's own immovable."°4 Doctrinal writers
have overwhelmingly approved of the solution reached by the Ger-
man courts. ' In Greece, servitudes may be created either by title
or by prescription and no one can have a servitude on his own im-
movable. However, the intent to establish a servitude by title may
be tacit. Thus, in Greece, when the owner of two contiguous tracts
that are served by the same construction sells one of the tracts to
another person, a servitude may be created without express
agreement.' °0 In such a case, the result resembles the creation of a
servitude by destination of the owner.
Unity of Ownership; Causes of Separation
For servitudes to be created by destination of the owner, the domi-
nant estate and the servient estate must have belonged in the past
to the same person.107 This may be proven by all sorts of evidence,
including oral testimony.10
According to well-settled French doctrine and jurisprudence, an
owner may establish a relationshp of destination between two separate
estates or between two parts of the same estate. Thus the owner
of an estate may establish a charge on a part of his estate in favor
of another part, and he may create a servitude by destination upon
transfer of one of the parts to another person.' This reasoning should
be applicable in Louisiana also, as witnessed by the fact that article
741 of the Civil Code speaks of "the owner of the immovable."'1'
104. See Judgment of Nov. 14, 1933, Amtsgericht Bargteheide, 1933 [R.G.Z.] 142,
231, 234.
105. See 0. VON GIERKE, DAS SACHENRECHT DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS 142 (4th ed.
1959); J. HEDEMANN, SACHENRECHT DES BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 249 (3d. ed. 1960);
3 H. SOERGEL-SIEBERT-BAUR, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 376 (9th ed. 1960); 3.2 J. VON
STAUDINGER-RING, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1030 (11th ed. 1963); H. WESTERMANN,
SACHENRECHT 608 (4th ed. 1960); WOLFF-RAISER, supra note 4, at 441.
106. See G. BALIS, supra note 3, at 322.
107. See Barton v. Kirkman, 5 Rob. 16 (1843). Article 768 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870 expressly required proof that in the past, the two estates had "belonged
to the same owner." This provision has not been reproduced in the 1977 revision.
However, there has been no change in the law. It should be evident that "there is
no destination under article 741 of the Civil Code unless -there is proof that the two
estates belonged to the same owner." LA. CIv. CODE art. 741, comment (b) (as revised
in 1977 and amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 479).
108. See Rozier v. Maginnis, 12 La. Ann. 108 (1857); 3 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, supra
note 66, no 252; 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 967.
109. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 967; Judgment of Nov. 17, 1847,
Cass. Civ., S.1848.1.30; Judgment of April 7, 1863, Cass. Req., S.1863.1.369; 3 C. AUBRY
ET C. RAU, supra note 66, at no 252.
110. LA. CIv. CODE art. 741(2) (as revised in 1977 and amended by 1978 La. Acts, No.
479) (emphasis added). See also Hebert v. Champagne, 144 La. 659, 81 So. 217 (1919);
Rozier v. Maginnis, 12 La. Ann. 108 (1857).
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It is not necessary for the creation of a servitude by destination
of the owner that the dominant estate and the servient estate be
contiguous."' It suffices that the two estates are in such proximity
that the dominant estate may derive some utility from the charge
on the servient estate.
The cause by which the dominant and the servient estate cease
to belong to the same owner is immaterial. The owner may alienate
one of the two estates voluntarily, an estate may be partitioned by
the heirs or legatees of the owner, or there may be a judicial sale
or expropriation of an estate or of a part of it."' Further, according
to French doctrine and jurisprudence, a servitude may be created by
destination when the two estates cease to belong to the same owner
because an adverse possessor has acquired the ownership of one of
them by acquisitive prescription."'
Exterior Sign of Servitude
For the creation of a servitude by destination of the owner, there
must be a relationship between two estates or two parts of the same
estate that would be a servitude if there were two different owners."4
In the case of a formal destination, the relationship is established by
the recordation of the declaration. In the case of an informal destina-
tion, the relationship is established by exterior signs on either the
dominant estate or the servient estate."' Article 769 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 expressly required "an apparent sign of servitude""6
between the two estates. This language has not been reproduced in the
1977 revision. However, there is no change in the law. Article 741 in-
dicates clearly that in the absence of a formal declaration, only apparent
servitudes may be created by destination of the owner, namely, servitudes
"perceivable by exterior signs, works, or constructions." 7
111. See Judgment of Feb. 9, 1885, Cour d'appel, Pau, 1885, D.1886.2.173.
112. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 971; 5 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE,
supra note 24, n0 1118.
113. Id.; 3 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, supra note 66, no 252.
114. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 741(1) (as revised in 1977 and amended by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 479).
115. See Judgment of April 2, 1954, Cass. Req., D.1854.1.272, S.1855.1.117; 3 M.
PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 968.
116. LA. CiV. CODE art. 769 (repealed in 1977); FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 694.
117. LA. CIV. CODE art. 707.
A servitude by which a building is permitted to encroach on neighboring property
is apparent and may be created by destination of the owner. Cf. Carlon v. Marquart,
10 So. 2d 246 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942). Likewise, a servitude for the maintenance of
a building on the property of another person is apparent. See Woodcock v. Baldwin,
51 Ld. Ann. 989, 26 So. 46 (1899); Lovecchio v. Graffagnini, 90 So. 2d 694 (La. App.
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According to French doctrine and jurisprudence that ought to be
pertinent for Louisiana, the exterior sign must be characteristic of
the particular kind of servitude that the owner of the dominant estate
claims and it must also be indicative of the intent of the former owner
to establish the servitude."8 Further, the sign must exist at the time
of separation of the dominant estate from the servient estate and
it must be of a nature to support the idea of a tacit agreement for
the creation of the servitude. Works made for the personal conve-
nience of the owner of an estate and, in general, works that are not
indicative of an intent to establish a servitude do not meet this
requirement."9
For both formal and informal destination, the relationship between
the two estates or between the parts of the same estate must be
established or at least maintained by the owner.20 Personal action
by the owner is not required; action by a mandatary or other represen-
tative suffices. A lessee, a tenant farmer, or a usufructuary does not
represent the owner and may not establish a destination between two
estates or between parts of the same estate.
An owner under a resolutory condition may establish a servitude
by destination, but the servitude is extinguished upon the dissolution
of his right. 2' A co-owner may not establish a destination between
two parts of an estate that is held in indivision. Thus despite the
existence of exterior signs of servitude that have been erected by
Orl. Cir. 1956) (servitude for the maintenance of a storeroom on the property of another).
Such a servitude, though discontinuous under the prior law, may now be acquired
by destination of the owner.
118. See Judgment of July 9, 1867, Cass. Civ., S.1867.1.323; Judgment of April 15,
1872, Cass Req., D.1872.1.415, S.1873.1.146; Judgment of June 19, 1893, Cass. Req.,
D.1893.1.526, S.1893.1.340; Judgment of May 8, 1895, Cass. Civ., S.1895.1.272. See also
Gottschalk v. De Santos, 12 La. Ann. 473 (1857).
119. See Judgment of July 15, 1875, Cass. Req., D.1877.1.127, S.1875.1.419; Judg-
ment of March 7, 1876, D.1878.1.69, S.1876.1.204. See also Barton v. Kirkman, 5 Rob.
16 (1843). Article 768 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 indicated that the intention
to establish a servitude by destination could be presumed upon proof that the two
estates had belonged to the same owner and that exterior signs of servitude were
erected by that owner. This provision has not been reproduced in the 1977 revision.
The intent to establish a destination is no longer presumed; the court is free to draw
the appropriate inferences from proof that the two estates belonged in the past to
the same owner and that he erected the exterior signs of servitude.
120. See 3 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, supra note 66, no 252; 5 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE,
supra note 24, no 585. Article 768 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 required proof
that the exterior signs of servitude were erected by the former owner. This provision
has not been reproduced in the 1977 revision. However, it should be evident that there
is no destination under article 741 of the Civil Code unless there is proof that the
exterior signs were erected by the former owner.
121. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 774.
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a co-owner, no servitude comes into existence upon partition of the
property.'22 This is a consequence of the qualification of partition as
a declarative act.
OTHER MODES OF CREATION OF SERVITUDES
Expropriation; St. Julien Doctrine
Conventional servitudes may also be created in civil law systems
by modes not regulated in civil codes. One such mode is the expropria-
tion of a servitude for public utility.'23
Ordinarily, entities having the power of expropriation enjoy discre-
tion to expropriate the ownership of immovable property or to ex-
propriate merely a servitude."4 When a servitude is expropriated, the
owner of the immovable property is entitled to receive an indemnity
for the value of the servitude taken" 5 plus severance damages.126 The
servitude established by expropriation may be permanent or
temporary. 1
27
When land sought to be expropriated is burdened with a servitude,
the expropriating authority must expropriate both ownership and ser-
vitude. The person entitled to the servitude is a necessary party to
122. See 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 969.
123. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 12:428 (Supp. 1968); LA. R.S. 19:1 (Supp. 1975); LA. R.S. 45:254
(1950); M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA (1970); Comment,
Expropriation-A Survey of Louisiana Law, 18 LA. L. REV. 509, 533-536 (1958). For
France, see 3 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 9, no 338-340. For Germany, see H.
WOLFF-RAISER, supra note 3, at 444; 3.2 J. VON STAUDINGER-RING, supra note 105, at 1044.
For Greece, see G. BALIS, supra note 3, at 186.
124. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 48:217 (Supp. 1955 & 1970). Such servitudes are ordinarily
established in favor of a person rather than an estate; accordingly, they are limited
personal servitudes rather than predial servitudes. The rules governing predial ser-
vitudes apply by analogy to limited personal servitudes. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PER-
SONAL SERVITUDES S 119 (2d ed. 1978).
125. For valuation, see Central Louisiana Elec. Co. v. Fontenot, 159 So. 2d 738
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964):
It has been established that where only a servitude or easement is expropriated,
and the landowner will continue to have some use of the property included within
the right of way, the servitude taken should be valued at a percentage of the
fee value of the land and not at its full value... However, where the expropria-
tion of a servitude completely destroys the suitability of the land for the pur-
poses for which it is best suited, it is proper to award the landowner the full
fee value even though merely a servitude is expropriated.
Id. at 741.
126. See Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Bonin, 217 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1969); Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Sugarland Dev. Corp., 221 So. 2d 593
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
127. See State v. Cefalu, 233 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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the expropriation proceedings128 and has a right to an indemnity for
the taking of his property."2 When the land sought to be expropriated
is subject to a recorded lease, the leasehold interest must likewise
be expropriated.'1 If there is an unrecorded lease, the indemnity of
expropriation is apportioned between the lessor and the lessee in pro-
portion to the value of the interest of each. 3' In such a case, there
is no separate expropriation of the leasehold interest.
In Louisiana, servitudes may not be created by estoppel."2
However, in the past a judicially created estoppel, known as the St.
Julien doctrine, allowed entities having power of expropriation to ac-
quire servitudes by unopposed use and possession of another's land
for some public purpose."3 The landowner could sue for the value of
the servitude taken," but not for damages or for the removal of works.
128. See Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Fruge, 210 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1968).
129. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Louisiana Dept. of Highways, 104 So. 2d
204 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
130. See State v. Holmes, 221 So. 2d 811 (La. 1969); Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co. v. Hoyt, 252 La. 921, 125 So. 2d 114 (1968).
131.- Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Walet, 225 So. 2d 76 (La App. 3d Cir. 1969).
132. See Greene v. Greene, 373 So. 2d 756 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); United Gas Pipeline
Co. v. Bellard, 286 So. 2d 109 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Prentice v. Amax Petroleum
Corp., 220 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
133. The doctrine was named after its parent case-St. Julien v. Morgan's La. &
Tex. Ry. Co., 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883). In Doll v. Sewerage & Water Board of New
Orleans, 43 So. 2d 271, 273 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949), the court designated the ser-
vitude as "extra-codal." In Veillon v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 192 So. 2d 646,
648 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), the servitude was labelled the "St. Julien servitude." For
the reasons why Louisiana courts developed the doctrine, see Harrison v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 288 So. 2d 37, 40 (1974) ("Since a public utility has the right of
expropriation, allowing retention of the property taken extra-legally, upon payment
of just compensation merely avoids an eviction and subsequent reacquisition by ex-
propriation."). See also Istre v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 329 So. 2d 486, 491 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1976) ("The St. Julien doctrine is founded on public policy and natural
equity, to prevent one who by silence acquiesces in a taking for a public purpose from
thereafter disrupting or making unduly burdensome the use for such a purpose.").
For acquisition of a servitude by the St. Julien doctrine, there was no need for
a prescriptive period. Occupancy of the land with the knowledge, consent, or ac-
quiescence of the owner sufficed. Doll v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans,
43 So. 2d 271, 273 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949).
134. See Taylor v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 126 La. 420, 52 So. 562 (1910); State
Dept. of Highways v. Poole, 243 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970). The action lor
recovery of the value of the servitude was subject to a ten-year prescriptive period.
See Brewer v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 128 La. 544, 54 So. 987 (1911); McCutchen v. Texas,
P. Ry. Co., 118 La. 436, 43 So. 42 (1907). But cf. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2630; LA. R.S. 9:5624
(1950) & 19:2.1 (Supp. 1974); Brooks v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 370 So. 2d
686 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 512 (1979).
The action for the value of the servitude taken is personal. A subsequent purchaser
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In Lake, Inc. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., the Louisiana Supreme
Court prospectively overruled the line of decisions establishing the
St. Julien doctrine.' The court gave convincing reasons for the aban-
donment of the "deviant and conflicting" jurisprudence generated by
the doctrine and for "return to the Civil Code provisions governing
the establishment of servitudes.""'
Subsequently, the Louisiana legislature enacted Act No. 504 of
1976 ." The act provides that when the state, its political subdivisions,
or private corporations having power of expropriation take, in good
faith, possession of the immovable property of another person and
construct on, under, or over its facilities with the consent or ac-
quiescence of the landowner, a presumption arises that the landowner
waived his right to receive just compensation prior to the taking; in
such a case, the landowner's remedy is an action for determination
of whether the taking was for a public and necessary purpose and
for just compensation. The act did not overrule legislatively the Lake
decision. Thus the St. Julien doctrine is not resurrected; it merely
feeds on servitudes established prior to Lake."8
CONCLUSION
The provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code governing the crea-
tion of predial servitudes by acquisitive prescription and destination
of the owner were revised in 1977. The preceding analysis has
demonstrated that the revision did not depart in any way from the
civilian tradition. The revised articles of the Louisiana Civil Code con-
tinue, for the most part, to relate to the provisions of the Louisiana
Civil Codes of 1870, 1825, and 1808, and to the corresponding provi-
sions of the Napoleonic Code. Thus, prior Louisiana jurisprudence and
doctrine, as well as French jurisprudence and doctrine, continue to
of the land has no right of action for indemnity in the absence of express assignment.
Rogers v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 391 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
135. 330 So. 2d 914 (La. 1976). See Rogers v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 391
So. 2d 30 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); State v. Champagne, 371 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1979); Note, The Fall and Rise of the St. Julien Doctrine, 22 Loy. L. REV. 1066
(1976); cf. Sutherland, Two Decisions in Search of a Reversal, 24 LA. B.J. 31 (1976).
136. 330 So. 2d at 918.
137. See 1976 La. Acts, No. 504 (now LA. R.S. 19:14). For a commentary, see
Legislative Symposium: Expropriation, 37 LA. L. REv. 147-150 (1976). Cf. Willis v.
Southwest La. Elec. Membership Corp., 357 So. 2d 1313 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (ac-
quisition of servitude under LA. R.S. 12:428).
138. See Yiannopoulos, The Work of the Louisiana Appelate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term -Property, 37 LA. L. REV. 327 (1977); Note, Property-Expropriation-Demise and
Resurrection of the St. Julien Doctrine, 51 TUL. L. REV. 375 (1977).
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be relevant for the interpretation and application of the new
legislation.
Changes in the law have been interstitial. They have been made
in the light of contemporary needs and demands. An important change
in the law has resulted from the suppression of the distinction of ser-
vitudes into continuous and discontinuous. According to Article 742,
all apparent servitudes may be acquired by prescription. The revi-
sion has thus broadened the availability of acquisitive prescription by
dispensing with the requirement of continuity. Another change in the
law is the extension of the destination of the owner to nonapparent
servitudes by means of a prerecorded juridical act. The last signifi-
cant improvement in the law is the clarification of the requirements
for the acquisitive prescription of ten years and thirty years.
For the rest, the revised articles of the Louisiana Civil Code in
this field will not be interpreted and applied in isolation but against
the background of the entire Civil Code, special legislation,
jurisprudence, and doctrine.
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